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Abstract: Rework is a chronic problem in construction and engineering projects. A plethora of 7 
studies examining the nature of rework have been undertaken since Burati et al. (1992) examined 8 
quality deviations. Early studies initially focused on identifying the causal factors and costs of 9 
rework to quantify the severity of the problem. These initial studies recognized that because rework 10 
causes are both interdependent and complex, techniques such as Cognitive Mapping and System 11 
Dynamics were introduced to model this phenomena. These models provided invaluable insight 12 
needed to stimulate theory development – yet despite this advance in knoweldge, rework remains 13 
a pervasive issue. Several factors have have exacerbated the prevailing causal ambiguity, for 14 
example, the epistemological underpinning used to construct the nature of causes and the 15 
subsequent use of analysis tools and techniques. Evidence of this ambiguity is presented in recent 16 
studies that have failed to acknowledge the interdependency of rework causes. Indeed, research 17 
has regressed to identifying causality of singular nature using one-dimensional tools such as 18 
questionnaire surveys. Consequently, such research continues to stymie progress toward reducing 19 
and containing rework and a moratorium for such approaches to examine rework causation is 20 
suggested. With this in mind, insights into the extant rework literature and causation philosophy 21 
are examined and recommendations to improve the understanding necessary to establish a theory 22 
for rework causality are proposed. 23 
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Introduction 25 
“We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a 26 
difference from what would have happened without it. Had it been absent, its effects — some of 27 
them, at least, and usually all — would have been absent as well.” (Lewis, 1973b, p.161) 28 
 29 
Rework remains a chronic problem in construction and engineering projects (e.g. Burati et al., 30 
1992; Barber et al., 2000; Li and Taylor, 2014). Various definitions of rework have been 31 
propagated, which has resulted in significant discrepancies in reported costs. For example, Rogge 32 
et al. (2001) defined rework as: “activities in the field to be done more than once in the field or 33 
activities which remove work previously installed as part of the project.” Love (2002a) defined it 34 
as the: “unnecessary effort of re-doing a process or activity that was implemented incorrectly the 35 
first time, which accommodates design and construction errors, omission and changes, which may 36 
arise.”  Conversely, Robinson-Fayek et al. (2004) refers to rework as the: “total direct cost of re-37 
doing work in the field regardless of initiating cause.” Robinson-Fayek et al. (2004) specifically 38 
state that their definition excludes change orders and errors due to off-site manufacture, which are 39 
not considered as rework. Such differences have been further compounded by the methods used to 40 
quantify rework costs, and naturally this also impacts upon determining its causal nature (Love 41 
and Sing, 2013). For example, case study based-research that relied upon close interaction with 42 
contractors and establishment of a formal measurement system revealed that direct rework costs 43 
during construction ranged from 2% to 5% of contract value (e.g. Love and Li, 2000; Robinson-44 
Fayek et al., 2004; Kakitahi et al., 2014; Taggart et al., 2014). When indirect costs of are 45 
considered (Barber et al., 2000) rework increased to 16% and 23% of contract value. These 46 
estimates included an allowance for the cost of delays that were incurred. If these were removed, 47 
then rework costs would have equated to 3.6% and 6.6% of contract value. Love (2002b) suggested 48 
that indirect rework can have a ‘multiplier effect’ of up to six times the actual (direct) cost of 49 
rectification. Case study research undoubtedly has its merits however, the number of cases 50 
presented in studies has been limited and thus only stimulated research to be repeatedly exploratory 51 
instead of being explanatory, which is essential for developing theory of rework causation in 52 
construction (Love et al., 2002)  53 
 54 
With tight profit margins and the need for higher productivity levels, clients and their project teams 55 
cannot ignore rework as ultimately business survival is jeopardized. Despite considerable research 56 
undertaken to date, there is a clear paucity of evidence to confirm that rework is being reduced or 57 
contained in projects despite similar costs and causes being identified more than 25 years ago (e.g. 58 
Aiyetan, 2013; Hwang et al., 2014; Kakitahi et al., 2014; Taggart et al., 2014; Jingmond and 59 
Ågren, 2015). Building upon knowledge accrued to date, this paper provides insights into rework 60 
causation and specifically calls for a moratorium for future studies to provide a contextual 61 
backdrop via which to better understand the rework connundrum. The research culminates with 62 
the philosophical stance that past research may have maligned our ability to delevop a deeper and 63 
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richer awareness as to ‘why’ and ‘how’ rework arises in projects; this in turn has impeded the 64 
development of a ‘theory’ for its causation. 65 
 66 
Rework Causation 67 
A plethora of rework related studies have focused on identifying specific causation factors and 68 
how they influence the cost and schedule performance of projects (e.g. Love and Li, 2000; Love 69 
et al., 2004; Love and Edwards, 2004; Hwang et al., 2009; Love et al., 2009a,b: Aiyetan, 2013; 70 
Hwang et al., 2014; Kakitahi et al., 2014). For example, Ye et al. (2014) concluded that:  71 
 72 
 “Because the majority of rework causes identified in this study confirm those found in 73 
previous work, the findings from this study consolidate existing knowledge with new evidence 74 
from China. New causes, such as contract management, active reworks, and scope 75 
management, are also identified, which helps expand existing knowledge for the global 76 
construction community”  77 
 78 
A closer examination of the literature by Ye et al. (ibid) reveals that the purported ‘new’ causes 79 
were identified in previous studies more than decade ago (e.g. Rodrigues and Bowers, 1996; Love 80 
et al., 1999; Josephson et al., 2002; Love and Edwards, 2004). Similarly, the work of Hwang et 81 
al. (2014) and Kakitahi et al. (2014) were previously reported upon by Burati et al. (1992) and a 82 
abundance of other studies conducted in the 1990s (e.g. Abdul-Rahman, 1995; CIDA, 1995; Love 83 
et al., 1999). Within hindsight, the rework related research of Ye et al. (2014), Hwang et al. (2014), 84 
Kakitahi et al. (2014), Taggart et al. (2014) and Jingmondand Ågren (2015) has either unwittingly 85 
regressed knowledge to historical milestones already firmly established within the extant literature 86 
or has been subject to conscienous-raising. Ye et al. (2014) provide an exemplar to support this 87 
assertion when they simply list rework causes derived from a questionnaire and then use ‘Factor 88 
Analysis’ from a heterogeneous sample to add statistical rigor to determine a commonality of 89 
groupings for variables without defining the context regards how rework arose in the projects they 90 
sampled. Love et al. (2009a), undertook similar work but produced a Structural Equation Model 91 
without providing the underlying knowledge needed to be able reduce and contain rework (Love 92 
et al., 2015a). 93 
  94 
Notably, seeking opinions about rework causes from heterogeneous samples through 95 
questionnaires is considered to provide uncertain results (e.g. Love and Edwards, 2004; Ye et al., 96 
2014). This is because respondents rarely view the same event at the same time and therefore, 97 
inconsistencies arise with the testimonies/ responses of other participants who are involved with 98 
the same project. Ye et al. (2014), for example, identify “poor communication path of project 99 
instructions” as a cause of rework, but this observation simplifies the complexity associated with 100 
how people interpret information. In explaining this complexity, Busby (2001) suggests that 101 
problems do not arise because X does not communicate Z to Y, but the way Y interprets Z in light 102 
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of some prior experience (or lack of), which X does not know about. Thus, X fails to make 103 
allowances for Z, and Y does not realize X does this as Y thinks that both their experiences are 104 
representative. In short, improving communication practices via technology or using Building 105 
Information Modeling (BIM) will not reduce the incidence of rework per se. Fundamentally, work 106 
processes, policies, procedures and behaviours need to change in concert if rework is to be reduced 107 
(Love et al., 2011a). Suggesting that “unclear and ambiguous project process management” and 108 
“poor quality of construction technologies used” result in rework (Ye et al., 2014) are 109 
‘conditional’ not ‘casuality’ statements, especially as an infinite number of possible outcomes may 110 
arise from these declarations. An important distinction is that statements of causality require an 111 
antecedent or coincidence with the consequent events, whereas conditional statements do not 112 
require this temporal order. Thus, the epistemological underpinning used to draw conclusions of 113 
causality is misplaced in this instance. 114 
 115 
Several case studies have also derived ‘singular’ causal factors (c.f. Love and Li, 2000; Josephson 116 
et al., 2002). While such studies have attempted to provide a context to explain ‘why’ and ‘how’ 117 
rework arose, the views of those participants involved in the chain of events that lead to its 118 
occurrence are generally limited to specific points in time. Thus, the determination of causation is 119 
narrowly defined and potentially leads to bias being reported. Construction researchers have 120 
defined the ‘root cause’ of rework as a point in a causal chain which facilitates intervention that 121 
changes performance and/ or prevents an undesirable outcome.  However, ‘the root cause’ often 122 
merely represents the place in a point of time where a researcher decided to complete their 123 
investigation (Dekker, 2002; Hollnagel, 2004; Dekker, 2006). Consequently, sub-optimal rework-124 
mitigation solutions have been identified (Love et al., 2011a). This arrogant certainty of science 125 
has allowed notions to be constructed about rework yet the means of actively reducing it alludes 126 
the scientific community (Love et al., 2015b,c). 127 
 128 
Human Error and Rework 129 
Rework predominately arises due to human error, such as mistakes (rule or knowledge based), 130 
slips and lapses of attention, and acts of omission and commission (Love and Josephson, 2004; 131 
Love et al., 2011a; Love and Li, 2000; Taggart et al., 2014).  However, many rework studies have 132 
not consulted the error literature to understand why people performed the acts that lead to their 133 
occurrence and how they could have prevented the event from occurring (e.g. Ye et al., 2014; 134 
Kakitahi et al., 2014; Jingmond and Ågren, 2015).   135 
 136 
Observations of the conditions contributing to human error are drawn from Love et al.’s (e.g. 137 
2009b; 2012a,b) phenomenological research and are presented in Table 1. Two observations are 138 
repeatedly identified by Love and his colleagues; namely: (1) people breaking rules because of the 139 
belief that such augments efficiency, which is akin to procedural violations and omission errors; 140 
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and (2) organizations breaching specified work practices and procedures. When combined with 141 
project delivery strategies (that are risk averse for clients and place emphasis on competitive 142 
tendering), the propensity for risk-taking by consultants and contractors increases in order to 143 
maximize both their margins (Love et al., 2011b). 144 
 145 
Ford and Sterman (2003) provide an invaluable insight into what transpires when rework 146 
negatively influences an organization’s bottom-line and suggest that employees may  conceal it to 147 
avoid informing managers of ‘bad news’ and/ or present information that does not adhere to their 148 
beliefs. According to Ford and Sterman (2003) the practice of hiding mistakes is institutionalized 149 
in many organizations and is akin to an error or omission. In fact, Roth and Kliener (1996) 150 
observed a cultural mandate within engineering organizations of not informing people about 151 
problems unless solutions are forthcoming. Thus, concealing problems becomes standard practice 152 
(Ford and Sterman, 2003) which results in a ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. This wall of silence enables 153 
project team members to abrogate their direct responsibility thereby preventing any form of 154 
reprimand from their immediate manager. Regards the Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario, managers 155 
may question team members about project’s progress without being provided with all the necessary 156 
information. Team members can: “cooperate with one another by concealing the problems that 157 
they know exist, or defect by revealing” the issues that need to be addressed to the project manager 158 
(Ford and Sterman, 2003:p.215). If the project team members cooperate by concealing known 159 
problems, project costs and schedule will remain the same and they avoid blame. Revealing 160 
problems caused by others, may increase project cost and could led to schedule slippage, giving 161 
them the opportunity to attend to these issues. However, most people are reluctant to become a 162 
‘whistleblower’, given the the acrimony attached to such activity. 163 
Table 1. Observations of the conditions contributing to human error 164 
 165 
Observation 
 
Comment 
 No one had a clue, they had different 
understandings of the same event 
Parties involved in a rework event all had differing opinions as 
to ‘how’ and ‘why’ it occurred, as demonstrated in the example 
presented in Table 1. Basically, what may be apparent to one 
individual will differ to another. People select information to 
make sense of a situation as they perceive it to occur. It is 
deemed to be easier for people to seek confirming evidence for 
their current undertstanding than to test it and risk having to 
invest in significant time and effort in devising another 
explanation. 
 People filter out most of the 
information around them 
In this instance, people are only interested in the information 
required to undertake their task. If information is missing, then 
they may request it, though this will often depend on the ‘level’ 
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that is required. People possess a hierarchy of mental filters and 
thus select the information that best suits their needs. 
 Cultural differences increase the 
likelihood of different interpretations 
of the same event 
Differing parties involved in a delivery of a project have 
differing goals and objectives which are crafted as a result of 
their organization’s culture. What is considered relevant to one 
person may not be relevant to another as a result of the task they 
are undertaking and thus socio-political and organizational 
pressures can shape their perceptions and memory of an event. 
 Problems arise when the goals of 
people in the same organization start to 
diverge 
Organizations involved with delivering construction projects 
tend to have differing goals. A lack of understanding of each 
participating organizations roles and capabilities leads to 
divergence and problems arising.  
 People break rules to make work more 
efficient 
 
Time and cost are innate features of construction projects. Thus, 
within this context people make trade-offs between efficiency 
and thoroughness, which is guided by the experience and 
training a person has been given. 
 People’s decisions are a trade-off 
between the available information and 
the available time 
People often do not have enough time to complete their tasks. 
As a result, they rely on an alternative approach to produce the 
best decisions using the available nformation within the time 
they have. In addition, within construction there is a great deal 
of uncertainty and complete information is often not made 
available. 
 People make mistakes. Organizations 
make it possible for the mistakes to be 
really serious 
Inadequate time, design, staffing and the lack of good 
management that contribute to errors may combine to make a 
situation even worse. For example, building failure, which may 
result in injury or even deaths. 
 166 
For reasons of self-preservation, it is better to allow other project team members to be blamed for 167 
the cost and schedule overruns that may occur. Should all team members reveal the problems 168 
known, project costs increase and the schedule slips, but all are apportioned blame from 169 
management – a lose-lose outcome for all. Refusing to admit to a negative outcome and to continue 170 
a course of action can contribute to rework and is referred to ‘defensive avoidance’ (Love et al., 171 
1999; Janis and Mann, 1977). Shaw (1981) provides several explanations for this phenomenon. 172 
First, people pursue a course of action in spite of negative feedback; this suggests that people value 173 
tenacity, or perseverance, as they generally admire those who stick to their principles (Shaw, 174 
1981).  Second, people will forsake a more rational approach to difficult decision situations out of 175 
the concern with establishing consistency, a valued characteristic.  176 
 177 
Systemic Approach 178 
The identification of singular causes (which in most cases only describe the proximal causes i.e. 179 
those nearest in time to the event) is counterintuitive, as rework causation can only be understood 180 
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by considering the whole project system holistically and how variables dynamically inter-react 181 
(Taylor and Ford, 2006; Aljassmi and Han, 2013; Han et al., 2013; Li and Taylor, 2014). Causality 182 
governs the relationship between events and its formalization enables a system to be constructed 183 
that has a set of observable causal variables (Goodman et al., 2011). Techniques such as Cognitive 184 
Mapping (CM) and System Dynamics (SD) have been used to observe the behavior and determine 185 
the interdependency of causal rework events. However, these techniques have limitations and 186 
therefore an alternative epistemological underpinning to examining this phenomenon is proposed 187 
in this paper. Prior to introducing this alternative agenda, systemic approaches  presented in the 188 
literature are first examined.  189 
 190 
Cognitive Mapping 191 
Cognitive mapping (CM) enables people to process their environment, solve problems and use 192 
memory. It is derived from Kelly’s (1955) theory of personal constructs, which suggests that: “we 193 
make sense of the world in order to predict how, ceteris paribus, the world will be in the future 194 
and to decide how we might act or intervene to achieve what we prefer within that world: a predict 195 
and control view of problem solving” (Ackermann et al., 1992: p.1). Operations Researchers have 196 
extensively used this qualitative technique as a tool to construct, organize and analyse data related 197 
to project performance and disputes by enabling a structured account of the problem to be created 198 
(e.g. Ackermann et al., 1997; Williams et al., 2003; Ackermann and Eden, 2005; Ackermann, 199 
2012). In addressing issues associated with project performance and disputes, rework was 200 
identified as major contributor and has been accordingly mapped. However, creating a cognitive 201 
map for rework is a time-consuming process for the person charged with undertaking the task of 202 
comprehending information presented, typically in an interview or focus group format, while 203 
having to simultaneously remember the guidelines required to produce the influence diagram. As 204 
a result, salient issues that contributed to events that lead to the rework event may be overlooked. 205 
 206 
While CM provides a graphical structure for addressing the ‘messiness’ associated with 207 
understanding rework causation, a number of factors such as cognitive perspectives, cognitive 208 
reference points, and the specific rotation to a frame of reference, can distort the memory and 209 
judgment of the person being interviewed (Tversky, 1993). Hence, when utilizing CM it is 210 
important to obtain multiple views that can explain the rework events occurrence (Tversky, 1993). 211 
Addressing this issue may create an overly complicated diagram that is difficult to understand, 212 
particularly for practitioners who may have limited knowledge of the concept. Notwithstanding 213 
this limitation, CM is a useful tool for understanding the complexity associated with rework 214 
causation (Jingmond and Ågren, 2015). 215 
 216 
System Dynamics 217 
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System dynamics (SD) has been used extensively to model the dynamic and complex nature of 218 
projects, particularly errors and rework (e.g. Lynies and Ford, 2007; Han et al., 2013). Both the 219 
qualitative (e.g. influence and causal loop diagrams (CLD)) and quantitative (e.g. stock-flow and 220 
simulation) dimensions of SD have been utilised to develop models that explain the behavior and 221 
impact of rework on project performance (Ackermann et al., 1997). Copper’s (1993a; b) influential 222 
work provided the platform for examining the systemic nature of rework and is core to 223 
understanding how SD is applied to projects. The ‘Rework Cycle’ provides a description of 224 
workflow that incorporates rework and undiscovered rework.  Work rate is determined by staff 225 
skills, productivity and availability, and as project time advances, the amount of work remaining 226 
reduces. Work is then completed to a specified standard or becomes undiscovered rework that 227 
contains errors that have yet to be identified but are perceived to have been undertaken. Latent 228 
errors are often not immediately identifiable and only transpire after a period of incubation in the 229 
system. After some time these errors are eventually detected, or they arise in due course and rework 230 
is identified, which increases the amount of work to be undertaken (Cooper, 1993; Rodrigues and 231 
Williams, 1998). Akin to CM, CLDs have invariably been based upon interview data and thus a 232 
participant’s memory and judgment is predominantely relied upon to give an account of what 233 
transpired. Moreover, conditional statements are used to create an association or determine an 234 
influence and while plausible, the issue of causation remains an unaddressed issue. A lack of real 235 
life industry specific data (such as design errors) to create and simulate the dynamic nature of 236 
rework using stock-flows also diminishes the accuracy, validity and reliability of SD models  237 
(Tombesi, 2000).  238 
 239 
Context: Judgement and Counterfactual Alternatives 240 
When constructing graphical causal diagrams, it should be noted that people’s thoughts about the 241 
causal relationships between rework events influence their judgments of the plausibility of 242 
‘counterfactual alternatives’. Equally, their ‘counterfactual thinking’ about how a situation could 243 
have turned out differently can change their judgments of the causal role of events as well as those 244 
responsible (Roese and Olson, 1995; Roese, 1997). Yet according to Bryne (2005) identifying the 245 
cause of an event and the counterfactual thoughtdo not always correspond. This is due to 246 
participants in projects distinguishing between the various type of causes and making different 247 
inferences from dissimilar causes (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976; Love et al., 2015a). In 248 
addressing this shortcoming, a contractor, who is preparing a rework claim may sieve through the 249 
available evidence and look for fragments of information that seem to point to a common cause in 250 
developing a priori explanation. While this approach is common, it is also problematic as (Dekker, 251 
2006) notes: 252 
 253 
 details that are relevant to explaining the actions and behaviors of people can be overlooked; 254 
and 255 
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 the information collated is meaningless outside the context where it originated. Invariably 256 
the pieces of information obtained are combined with those of a similar nature, though it 257 
may have its own context and raison d'etre. In fact, when the data was produced it may be 258 
divorced from other fragments of information which it has been combined with. 259 
 260 
Taking information out of context by selecting and combining it together in hindsight or micro-261 
matching it with a view that the contractor knows now to be true is misleading as the original 262 
context and meaning becomes redundant and a new sense adopted. The construction of a rework 263 
‘cause’ is dependent upon the experience and views of those who are involved with the event. For 264 
example, Love et al. (1999) sought to explain ‘why’ and ‘how’ the pitch of a structural steel framed 265 
roof for a residential building failed building regulations and subsequently had to be re-designed 266 
and re-engineered. Drawing from the vignette presented in Love et al. (1999), the differing points 267 
of view as to the contributing causes of rework, from the perspective of the contractor and architect, 268 
are presented in Table 2.  269 
 270 
Table 2. Differing points of view: Contributing causes for the same rework event 271 
 272 
Contractor 
 
Architect 
 Errors in contract documentation provided by the 
architect 
 Limited time provided by the client to document 
the design 
 Inadequate design audits and design review by the 
architect and structural engineer 
 Structural engineer’s design did not ‘actively’ 
coordinate and integrate with the architectural 
design  
 Inadequate use of technology to coordinate the 
architectural and engineering design 
 Workload increase due to discrepancies in the 
architectural and structural engineering drawings 
 Over-reliance by the architect to ensure the 
contractor would identify errors prior to 
construction 
 Contractor did not plan and coordinate works on 
site with other trades 
 273 
Unsurprisingly, the factors identified by both parties contributed to the rework that materialized 274 
but in this instance, the parties may have selectively chosen those that have contributed to the 275 
event. Invariably socio-political, cultural and organizational pressures rather than the context 276 
within which they arose may have driven their selection in this instance.  Considering this scenario, 277 
Dekker (2006) suggested that a: “cause is not something you find. Cause is something you 278 
construct. How you construct it and from what evidence, where you look, what you look for, who 279 
you talk to, what you have seen before, and likely on whom you work for.” 280 
 281 
Understanding of Causation: Issues and Challenges 282 
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Studies examining rework causation have not been based upon a theory. The establishment of 283 
relationships have been based upon people’s innate ability to infer the causal structure of a project 284 
system is derived from the individual’s organisational culture and relationships. As for any 285 
inductive task, causal inference is an ill-posed problem: the data that is viewed undermines the 286 
true causal structure (Tenebaum and Griffth, 2003). This is a statistician’s dilemma as a 287 
‘correlation does not imply causation’; a mere association exists (ibid). The assumption, that 288 
correlation proves causation, is considered to be a ‘questionable cause fallacy’ whereby two events 289 
occurring together are taken to have a cause-and-effect relationship (Cavender and Kahne, 2010). 290 
Essentially, a causal connection is assumed without proof. This fallacy is also known as cum hoc 291 
ergo propter hoc, (i.e. “with this, therefore because of this”, and ‘false cause’ A similar fallacy 292 
whereby an event that follows another is necessarily a consequence of the first event, is described 293 
by Damer (1995) as post hoc ergo propter hoc (i.e. “after this, therefore because of this”).  294 
 295 
A range of causality theories are categorized according to the way they address key questions (e.g. 296 
Russell, 1913; Salmon, 1998; Pearl, 2000; Hitchcock, 2012; Williamson, 2009). One question 297 
often posed is ‘are the causal relata single-case or generic’? A philosophical theory of causality 298 
might hold that a cause or effect concerns a single occasion and so either obtains or fails to obtain, 299 
for example, an contractor’s presentation of a claim to a client may cause them to a great deal of 300 
angst. Alternatively, it may hold that causes and effects can obtain and fail to obtain on different 301 
occasions: errors cause rework. In the former case, cause and effects are called single-case, 302 
particular or token-level and for the latter, they are generic, repeatedly instantiable or type-level 303 
(Williamson 2009). Another perspective of causation examines the causal relata at the individual 304 
or population level (ibid). At the population-level, a cause or effect concerns a group of individuals, 305 
for example, an increase in the number of change-orders in a project causes a reduction in the 306 
project team’s morale. The individual-level cause or effect concerns only one person at a time, for 307 
example, long working hours causes stress. According to Williamson (ibid): “such causal relata 308 
occur in our causal claims, so any theory that considers one kind to the exclusion of others 309 
provides only a partial account of causality.”. With this in mind, the causal relata of a rework 310 
event should then be determined from the perspectives of the individual, organization and project 311 
through an epistemological lens that accommodates varying perspectives to provide a thorough 312 
and balanced account of its causation. 313 
 314 
Several questions have also been raised concerning the causal relationship itself. For example, “is 315 
causality some kind of physical connection between cause and effect?” or is “it purely mental in 316 
the sense that it is a feature of some individual’s epistemic state?” (Williamson, 2006a,b; 317 
Williamson, 2009). Other questions seek to address “whether causal relationships are objective?” 318 
or “does the theory in question attempt to understand actual or potential causality”? In the former 319 
case, if two agents disagree to causal relationships, then at least one of them must be wrong or is 320 
it subjective, admitting a degree of personal choice? (Williamson, 2009). In addressing the latter, 321 
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the general case is referred to as potential or possible causation, while the factual is called actual 322 
causation. Such questions are pivotal to the on-going discourse about the philosophical theory of 323 
causality. 324 
 325 
A prominent approach to the study of causation has been to analyze it in terms of counterfactual 326 
conditionals (Paul, 2009); these represent a subjunctive conditional sentence, whose antecedent is 327 
contrary-to-fact (Hitchcock, 2012). For example “if a structural engineer had not specified 328 
reinforcement in concrete column, the building would have not collapsed.” In the case of 329 
indeterministic outcomes, it may be appropriate to use probabilistic consequents: “if a structural 330 
engineer had not specified reinforcement in the concrete columns, the probability of the building 331 
not collapsing would be 0.1.” Several studies have analyzed causation in terms of such 332 
probabilistic counterfactuals (e.g.  Balke, 1995; Di Tillio et al., 2012; Schacter et al., 2013). 333 
However, counterfactuals refer to specific events at particular times, thus such theories of 334 
causation are singular in nature (Hitchcock, 2012). Consider the research of Ye et al.(1994) where 335 
the relationship of “poor communication path of project instructions” with rework, implicitly 336 
assumes causality in terms of counterfactual dependence of the effect on the cause: the cause is 337 
rendered counterfactually necessary for the effect (Love et al., 2012). Ye et al.’s (2014) 338 
presupposition infers that if poor communication had not occurred, then the rework would not have 339 
ensued. Causality can be defined by reference to a causal chain of counterfactually dependent 340 
events, where a sequence of events (C, E, F, ...) is a chain of counterfactual dependence if E 341 
counterfactually depends on C, E counterfactually depends on F, and so on. Lewis (1973) asserted 342 
that “one event is a cause of another if and only if there exists a causal chain leading from the first 343 
to the second.”  344 
 345 
Various forms of counterfactual dependence have been adopted through the application of 346 
structural equations (e.g. Hitchcock, 2001) whereas limited studies have applied structural 347 
equations to examine the causal factors that contribute to rework (e.g. Love et al., 2009a). While 348 
such studies have provided a valuable contribution to understanding causal inferences through 349 
generalization, they have not provided a nomologically possible context. Such context would 350 
provide detail about how events unfold according to an underlying ‘event theory’, a set of 351 
background laws that define the outcome of events (Bell, 2004; Bell, 2007).  352 
 353 
Figure 1 illustrates three nomologically different contexts where strategic misrepresentation A and/ 354 
or optimism bias C could give rise to a cost and/ or time overrun E. Each node represents an event. 355 
In this instance the occurrence of event A or C or both (at some implicit point in time) is the cause 356 
of the occurrence of event E (at a later point in time). In the context of (a), C and D are proximate 357 
(as are A and D), and C and E are remote. The occurrence of C stimulates D, in this case a error, 358 
but inhibits B. The occurrence of D then results in E (i.e. rework). Besides, poor communication 359 
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or inappropriate use of technology (Ye et al., 2014), pathogenic influences can give rise to C and 360 
A, which can then trigger a series of events that result in E, rework (Love et al., 2012).   361 
 362 
 363 
 364 
 365 
Adapted from Love et al. (2012b) 366 
 367 
Figure 1. Nomologically different contexts each represent a different history  368 
 369 
Nonetheless, it has been widely acknowledged that Lewis’s theory (c.f. 1973) possesses several 370 
limitations (Menzies, 2014): 371 
 372 
 Context-sensitivity – assumes that causation is an absolute whose nature does not vary from 373 
one context to the another. According to Lewis (1973) every event has an objective causal 374 
history consisting of a vast structure of events ordered by causal dependence. Hence, the 375 
human mind may select parts of the causal history for attention, perhaps different parts for 376 
different purposes of enquiry.  377 
 Temporal asymmetry – assumes that time is fundamentally asymmetrical and there is a 378 
profound difference between the past and the future. Even if the notions of ‘cause’ and 379 
‘effect’ are stripped of their directional bias, there is no evidence to suggest that the resulting 380 
causal relation is always exemplified asymmetrically in time. As a result, this difference is 381 
in no way indicative of a qualitative difference between the direction of time from earlier to 382 
later and vice versa. 383 
 Transitivity  - assumes chains of causal dependence to ensure causation is transitive; a key 384 
focus of counterfactuals. However, other possible events that do not have a direct cause are 385 
not addressed and therefore the issue of preemption is not addressed; and   386 
 Preemption – is the root idea of causation. However, preemption does not explain how a 387 
preempting cause qualifies as a ‘cause’ when the effect does not causally depend on it. This 388 
(a) 
C D 
E 
A B 
(b) 
C D 
E 
A B 
(c) 
C D 
E 
A B 
Rework 
Different 
causal events 
Error 
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is akin to the example presented above that discounted the notion of identifying a root cause 389 
for rework. 390 
 391 
Menzies (1989) proffered a revision to Lewis’s original theory (1973) by specifying attention to 392 
the continuous processes that are linked to causes and effects. This account is designed to handle 393 
cases of probability-raising from non-causes. Menzies (1996) concedes that this account remains 394 
problematic with certain types of pre-emption, and discarded it opting in favor of causation as a 395 
‘Concept of a Theoretical Entity’, which treats it as an intrinsic relation between events. Thus, 396 
causation is defined by Menzies (1999) as: C causes E only if the intrinsic relation that typically 397 
accompanies causal dependence holds between C and E. In dealing with preemption and additional 398 
problems that relate to causes that affect the time at which an event occurs, Noordhof (1999) 399 
developed a counterfactual probabilistic ‘ceterbis parabis’ theory where causes increase the 400 
probabilities of their effects. Building on this theory, Schaffer (2000) provides an explanation 401 
attending to causes that raise the probability of specific processes, rather than individual events, 402 
which have been motivated by the problems of preemption and probability-lowering causes.  403 
 404 
To address the limitation of Lewis’s (1973) theory, Lewis (2000) developed a ‘Theory of 405 
Causation as Influence’, although it does not accommodate deterministic causation and so does 406 
not address probabilistic pre-emption (Menzies, 2014). The central notion of the Lewis’s (2000) 407 
‘Theory of Causation as Influence’ is expressed as: 408 
 409 
Where C and E are distinct events, C influences E if and only if there is a substantial 410 
range of C1, C2, … of different not-too-distant alterations of C (including the actual 411 
alteration of C) and there is a range of E1, E2, … of alterations of E, at least some of 412 
which differ, such that if C1 had occurred, E1 would have occurred, and if C2 had 413 
occurred, E2 would have occurred, and so on. 414 
 415 
Where one event influences another, there is a pattern of counterfactual dependence of whether, 416 
when, and how upon whether, when, and how. In this instance causation is defined as an ancestral 417 
relation whereby C causes E if and only if there is a chain of stepwise influence from C to E. An 418 
ancestral relation is essentially a relation that stands to another as ‘ancestor of’ stands to ‘parent 419 
of’: an ancestor is a parent, or parent of a parent, and so on (Frege, 1879). However, the 420 
counterfactuals employed in Lewis’s (2000) new theory do not state dependences of whether one 421 
event occurs on whether another event occurs. Instead, the counterfactuals state dependences of 422 
whether, when and how one event occurs on whether, when, and how another event occurs 423 
(Menzies, 2014). A key idea underpinning the formulation of these counterfactuals is that of an 424 
alteration of an event. This is an actualised or unactualised event that occurs at a marginally 425 
different time or in a dissimilar manner from the given event. Menzies (2014) states that an 426 
alteration is a fragile event that could not occur at a different time, or in a dissimilar manner without 427 
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being an altered event. Lewis (2000) intended that the derived terminology be neutral on the issue 428 
of whether an alteration of an event is a version of the same event or a numerically different event. 429 
Notably, Lewis’s (2000) new theory does accommodate cases of late as well as early pre-emption 430 
and therefore addresses, only to some extent, the issue of temporal asymmetry.  431 
 432 
Through counterfactual thinking, people can reason how past changes affect the present and use 433 
such reasoning for cognitive tasks including social judgments, causal attribution, problem solving 434 
and learning (Roese, 1997; Byrne, 2002). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) suggest that people 435 
reason counterfactually by using a ‘simulation heuristic’, whereby events are altered in their mind 436 
(via recurrent ruminations) and a simulation run of how things would have gone otherwise, given 437 
these changes. A point to consider at this juncture is the ‘conjuction fallacy’ whereby people tend 438 
to assume specific conditions are more probable than a single general one (Kahneman and Tversky, 439 
1983), rendering the complex task of assessing probabilities and predicting values to judgmental 440 
operations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). The subjective assessment of probability, often aligned 441 
with the use of qualitative diagrammatic aids such as CM and CLD to explain and examine rework 442 
causation are based on data with limited validity and therefore processed using heuristic rules and 443 
baises (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  444 
 445 
The preceding discussion, illustrates that research examining rework causation is immature and 446 
lacks a robust theorectical foundation, which has therefore inhibited its reduction in construction 447 
and engineering projects. A significant amount of ambiguity prevails as to ‘why’ and ‘how’ rework 448 
occurs, its causal structure and ways in which to effectively contain and reduce its occurrence.  449 
 450 
Implications for Research 451 
Science aims to determine whether a set of axiomatic events or propositions can be accepted as 452 
true and validate the complex facts that establish causal relationships. According to Wold (1954) 453 
“the concept of causality is indepensablee and fundamental to all sciences.”. Yet, in the pursuit 454 
of determing rework causation, a lack of a theorectical foundation or acknowledgement of 455 
complexity associated with its context, temporal asymmetry, transitiveness and preemptive nature 456 
has stagnated research and discernable improvements in practice. Future research should therefore 457 
place emphasis on establishing the counterfactual relationships between may exist between 458 
conditions. The notion of pathogenic influences providing the conditions for rework to materialize 459 
provides the basis for the use of counterfactual causation (Love et al., 2009b). The limitations of 460 
Lewis’s (2000) theory, need to be considered together with the heuristic rules and biases that form 461 
an integral part of people’s consciousness. In accommodating these issues, it is suggested that the 462 
development of theory based upon probabilistic causation and generalizations could provide 463 
underlying impetus to establish a setting for rework causation to be determined. Explicitly, to 464 
understand causal generalizations, there is a need to understand ‘how’ and ‘why’ participants in 465 
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projects generalize about the rework they encounter and the circumstances that lead to its 466 
occurrence. Hence, the metaphysical task is to clarify the causal relevance of variables within 467 
homogeneous contexts (Hausmann, 2010). The works of Noordhof (1999), Williamson (2009), 468 
Hausmann (2010), and Di Tillio et al. (2012), provide fundamental building blocks for testing and 469 
developing a probabilistic theory of rework causation. 470 
 471 
To generate generalizations for rework, however, it suggested that epistemological-based notion 472 
of sensemarking (Weick, 2001) can provide essential information needed to unearth probabilistic 473 
causation. Sensemaking is retrospective and grounded in identify construction and thus can be 474 
used to re-conceptualize and re-contextualize people’s mechanistic and positivistic notions of the 475 
social reality that lead to rework (Love et al., 2015a). By gaining an understanding of the 476 
individual’s role and views, plausibility extends beyond immediately observable phenomena; an 477 
attempt in this instance is made to fit together the evidence available to complete a puzzle despite 478 
not having some of the pieces. Thus, it is necessary to acquire multiple viewpoints from the causal 479 
chain. Obtaining such views will be a time-consuming, yet necessary validation process that will 480 
assist in the development of new theory. Without a valid and reliable theory of probabilistic 481 
causation, or variant thereof, for rework, empirical induction cannot provide researchers and 482 
practitioners with the needed rules to reject causal relationships and develop effect rework 483 
mitigation strategies.   484 
 485 
Conclusion 486 
This paper sought to highlight that the determination of rework causation research conducted to 487 
date, has had limited theoretical underpinning and is conceptually flawed. Having a theory to 488 
explain rework causation  serves as a benchmark upon which the means of effectively mitigating 489 
its presence can be developed for construction and engineering projects. Relating to a theory of 490 
rework causation, may increases its ability to solve other problems in different times and places.  491 
 492 
The comprehensive literature review conducted demonstrates that research into rework causation 493 
has stagnated. Factors identified decades are still being identified, yet rework remains a prevailing 494 
and chromic problem. Tools such as questionnaire surveys used to identify and rank a list of single 495 
causal factors have contributed to this stagnation because they provide no explanation of causality; 496 
thus, it is recommendation a moratorium being placed on such studies. Moreover, recent research 497 
has discounted the notion that rework causes arise from a chain of causal conditions and a 498 
seemingly counterfactual in nature with pathogens providing being preemptive. The limitations of 499 
assuming counterfactual causation are identified and thus need to be accommodated in a theory 500 
that can explain rework causation.  501 
 502 
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The braiding of an epistemological-based notion of sensemaking with probabilistic causation 503 
accommodates both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of rework causation needed to develop 504 
a balanced and robust theory. Future research should place emphasis on constructing a theory that 505 
can accommodate nomologically different contexts but also be generalizable and parsimonious.  506 
This is and will continue to be a challenge, but this paper provides the valuable insights needed to 507 
move research forward in rework causation. 508 
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